Iraq

[ewx]

I've just finished reading Hans Blix's book Disarming Iraq (ISBN 0747573581). Hans Blix is a former Director General of the IAEA who was called out of retirement to head UNMOVIC, the successor organization to UNSCOM, charged by the UN with ensuring Iraq no longer had various kinds of banned weapons.

The book is written in a pleasant and informal style. It recounts the public political process, stories from actual inspections, and many less public meetings with well-known figures. Condoleezza Rice seems to have made the best impression, amongst the USG actors in this particular drama. Iraqi figures seem to have been more cooperative in private than public protestations might suggest, though still not very cooperative; and UNMOVIC never managed to secure a meeting with Saddam Hussein. Whether he wanted to avoid such a meeting, or whether his subordinates were trying to shield him from it, is unclear; Blix seems to think the former but also speculated that he wasn't fully appraised of the seriousness of the situation.

There are some amusing anecdotes, for example:

On Saturday, January 22, our bus took us to a sweet town called El Calafate (the blueberry). Having been let down by the airline, which was to take us to Ushuaia, the world's most southerly town, our group was queueing at a tourist office to learn what was to happen next. A young lady called my name and I thought Eva and I would be among the lucky to get plane seats. No, the young lady informed me that someone by the name of Kofi Annan wanted me to phone him. The young lady had no idea that Kofi Annan was the secretary general of the United Nations, but other people standing in line did and looked curiously as Eva and I stepped out in search, for a second time, of a local telephone station.

He also mentions a meeting with Tony Blair - the PM arrived in a jogging suit but insisted on changing into more formal wear, and Blix seems to have been very happy at being served afternoon tea with crumpets.

Two striking points of the whole situation are (1) that the USA and other countries insisted that there were banned weapons to find; but in fact, none were found and (2) that Iraq spent many years obstructing inspections to a varying degree, remaining less than cooperative right until its doom rolled across the desert, but in fact it turned out to have nothing to hide. Both sides, in other words, acted in a manner disconnected from reality.

Blix seems pretty confident that the answer to the first of these conundrums is that the USG and the various intelligence agencies that agreed with it trusted defectors more than they trusted inspections. Since the same people are still at the top, we can but hope that they have learned from the experience, and that future spies and leaders will remember it.

As to the second he is less certain, though advances a number of possible reasons: an expectation that cooperation would not lead to the lifting of sanctions; national pride; a desire to look dangerous to hostile neighbours; the need to maintain secrecy concerning permitted military capabilities (UNSCOM had unhealthily close relationships with the very people who were still attacking Iraq at the time).

These all seem plausible. If the USA wasn't going to trust the results of inspections anyway, why let the inspectors in and risk them spying on the side? (But then, once invasion was in the air, why not cooperate, even if only to buy time? The alternative was certain destruction.) Several of Iraq's neighbours were certainly not well-disposed towards it, especially Iran. But in that case why dispose of existing banned weapons but then prevent inspection - why not keep them and also prevent inspection?

National pride makes great deal of sense as a theory to me. Iraq had been defeated on the battlefield, denuded of its most powerful weapons, and prevented from control even of its own airspace; the north of the country was semi-independent. Inspectors roaming the country freely, poking their noses into all sorts of places, would have been a further humilation. Some of the Iraqi complaints that Blix mentions could support this view: General Hussan Amin, for instance complained to UNMOVIC - rather than to a TV camera - about "provocative" behaviour from inspectors. (Street demonstrations and complaints to the media might have the same explanation, but could also be interpreted as PR rather than a genuine expression of over-touchy national pride).

It seems a shame that these questions don't seem to have been clearly answered, at least in public - captured members of the Iraqi government, who presumably were involved the relevant decisions, would seem to have little to lose by talking about it; but if so I've not seen any of the results yet.