Iran

[ewx]

What's Iran actually done?

From IAEA Board Report of 2005-09-02:

• Iran has imported, processed and enriched Uranium, and produced Plutonium, and kept all this secret, despite being an NPT signatory.
• Iran claims not to have enriched Uranium beyond 1.2%. IAEA inspectors found particles of low- and high-enriched Uranium beyond this level. These are thought to be contamination from outside Iran (B.1) but the question does not seem to be fully settled and further documentation is, apparently, required (para 45).
• Iran has been engaged in Polonium extraction (I don't know what the process is here). Polonium has civilian applications but is also used in conjunction with Beryllium in nuclear weapons. Iran has also attempted to acquire Beryllium (which also has civilian applications) but not succeeded. (B.5)

How significant is Iran's enrichment program?

1.2% is relatively harmless, as I understand it. But you don't need to enrich Uranium at all for power generation (there are kinds of reactors which require enriched Uranium, but you don't have to use that kind).

Russia has in any case offered to enrich Uranium for Iran, an offer Iran evidently feels is not good enough: they want a native enrichment facility.

I don't know how far their existing, or planned future, facilities could enrich Uranium. If it never gets beyond 1.2% then there's not so much to worry about. If it gets to 20% then that's weapons grade. Nobody seems to be talking in terms of Iran having a bomb any day now, so I guess their facilities, at least as estimated by outsiders, are probably inadequate for that purpose.

Iran reported to the UNSC

IAEA Resolution of 2006-02-04. This resolution reports Iran to the Security Council, accusing it of still hiding things; having weapons blueprints; and requires it to stop enrichment and extend access to inspectors.

Isn't this just Iraq all over again?

Firstly there seems to be more acceptance of a multilateral approach from the US. The EU has spent several years trying to negotiate a settlement, to no effect. There is no US army massing across the border (lots of US troops in Iraq, granted, but their hands will be rather full for the foreseeable future).

Equally there seems to be wider acceptance that something should be done, e.g. from France and Russia, probably because the evidence is much more credible in this case. Iran has admitted to breaches of the NPT and is being uncooperative in setting things to rights. (In contrast, the IAEA pretty much gave Iraq a clean bill of health on nuclear matters, and UNMOVIC found little to report despite the claims of the US and UK governments and various intelligence agencies).

If the USA can have nukes, why can't Iran?

Because both countries are parties to a treaty agreeing to this state of affairs. (Non-nuclear states get security guarantees out of this, incidentally - it's not merely a question of bowing to pressure to sign up.)

India, Pakistan and Israel never signed, which is why the IAEA isn't on their case too. It's been a very succesful treaty, incidentally: George Bunn, a former NPT negotiator, estimates that several dozen other countries would have nuclear weapons without it. With five to ten times as many fingers on the button, do we really think no-one would have pressed it again by now? Iranian intrasigence therefore represents a important test.

Hans Blix talks a lot about confidence in his book Disarming Iraq. An important function of UNMOVIC's inspections was to provide a way for Iraq to give other countries confidence that it did not have banned weapons; the inspections were an opportunity, not an imposition. Sadly Iraq didn't see it like that despite the fact that it would have gained from the process.

Thus it is with the IAEA; the resolution linked above about talks about transparency and confidence as well as suspension and compliance. The IAEA isn't a kind of policeman out to stop countries from gaining nuclear weapons; it provides (among other things) a means for countries that have promised they are not developing nuclear weapons to give assurances to other states that this is really so.

Iran's current actions are producing suspicion, not confidence. An evening trawling the IAEA site makes me think it's not just the US out to hobble one of its enemies but that concern about Iran's nuclear program is more widespread than that. Iraq demonstrates that states with nothing to hide may nonetheless behave as if they do have something to hide, and my impression of Iran's rulers is that they are mad enough to fall into just that trap; but Iraq also demonstrates how dangerous a course that can be.

Please do point out any facts that are wrong, or significant ones that are missing. (I'm sure people will debate interpretations without any prompting l-)

Comments

[(Anonymous)]

All the oil in the world won't solve your energy problems if you don't have enough oil-burning power stations and your uranium supplier just fell apart.

I think the whole affair can be interpreted as somewhat aggressive bargaining. They are attempting to demonstrate that they can enrich uranium, allowing them to produce nuclear power and sell their oil (which is probably cost-effective). It is in the interest of nations twitchy about other nations possessing the ability to enrich uranium to provide them with an alternative source of enriched uranium. It's quite possible that when someone makes them an actually attractive offer, they'll accept it.

[tienelle.livejournal.com]

Rasta frelling automatic logging-out.